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MINUTES OF IAC MEETING - 19 August 1949

DIRECTOR: The FBI telephoned and said because of the press of urgent business, they would have no representative here today. We have two proposals here. First, the four Problems by the State Department on suggestions for action between CIA and the other agencies. And would you just give a brief resume? I would like to suggest after he explains them briefly and after two or three thousand well chosen words we turn them over to the Standing Committee to work out.

MR. ARMSTRONG: As I said very briefly at the 22 July meeting of the IAC, the purpose of these papers was to attempt to identify and isolate the recommendations that have been approved by the National Security Council in NSC 50, based on the duties mentioned in the Dulles-Jackson-Correa Report which affected the IAC agencies and their relations with the CIA, distinguished from those which concern the internal organization of CIA. We felt originally that we could reduce it to five groups or combination of areas of activity and coordination and we subsequently eliminated for the time being the fifth group, so you now have four. The fifth one was on the subject of Guidance to CIA from the IAC Members and we may probably come forward with a brief paper on that later. I didn't feel that we had thought it out far enough or had it crystallized well enough to put it in at this time. The four papers we have submitted are first on the Coordination of Intelligence Activities in which a series of recommendations, fairly numerous, I'm sorry to say, are made as to fairly specific elements within the problem upon which the Department of State feels that the IAC Agencies and CIA can affect some improved efficiency. Generally speaking, I think it is fair to say in all of these papers the area of uncertainty or the area which recommendation applies most specifically is that between the Department of State and CIA. I doubt if it applies with the same force and breadth to the military intelligence agencies. The second paper is on the Production of National Intelligence, and, there again, we seek to clarify and make

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more precise the basis upon which the national intelligence papers are prepared and the manner in which contributions by the IAC Agencies are obtained and used. The third paper is on the question of responsibility for research and reports and stems from the recommendation in NSC 50 which the National Security Council approved that CIA should, to the greatest extent possible, call upon the facilities of the IAC agencies in their allocated field of responsibility. And in that particular paper we recommend that ICAPS prepare for consideration of the IAC the delineations of fields of common concern, but it is immaterial to the Department whether that be ICAPS or the Standing Committee. The fourth paper is with respect to political summaries. There we recognize that there are obligations laid upon CIA and upon the other agencies for production of periodic reports and summaries in their own fields. We do think the question is capable of clarification as particularly between CIA and State. For example, CIA's Daily Summary. Over a period of time, nearly 90% of the material incorporated in it was of a political-economic nature, and, therefore, is within the area of allocated responsibility for the Department of State. We are sympathetic with the problem that CIA is faced with in meeting its responsibility to the National Security Council, but we would like to see an effort made to clarify the problem so that greater use is made of the available IAC facilities in connection with the periodic summaries. That is, in brief, the account of the four papers and I don't believe that it is possible for us to settle the specific issues involved in the IAC without further work being done.

DIRECTOR: I would like to second Mr. Armstrong's statement on that. Any comments from the other people now? And if there are no comments, or after we have heard the comments we would like to pass these on to the Standing Committee to see what can be worked out and then refer them back to the IAC Members.

GEN. CABELL: I have only one comment, and I am a poor one to make it because we have not fulfilled our obligations on ICAPS. I wonder if it would be appropriately assigned to ICAPS for study and recommendations and not to the Standing Committee.

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MR. ARMSTRONG: That has been our original view.

DIRECTOR: As far as either one is concerned I think either one might be concerned, but I would like the Standing Committee to do it. As it has been particularly pointed out, ICAPS is supposed to belong to the Central Intelligence Agency and we would like to get the other people in on it. Either one, though, would be satisfactory with me. It would be easier, perhaps, to get concurrence if the Standing Committee did it then the agencies would all be in on it, but if the IAC Members want ICAPS to do it, we will.

GEN. TODD: My reaction is that a number of the recommendations made are already provided for in NSCID's and in one or two cases recommendations made to it are contrary to existing NSCID's, so they had better be on the alert for those..

DIRECTOR: To go back to this other thing, it would appear unilateral, if CIA does it, but we would rather get all the people in on it. What is the general concensus of the Board here? I will go along with either one.

GEN. CABELL: I would raise that point that I consider us disqualified because we don't have Air Force representation on ICAPS.

ADM. INGLIS: I have raised this point so many times that I think everyone is tired of hearing me say it, but I think ICAPS is not doing the job it should be doing. Under the charter that seems to be approved now for ICAPS, and I agree with Admiral Hillenkoetter, they are not competent to represent the Departments. They should be, but they are not.

GEN. CABELL: That is the burden of one of the papers that it should not represent the Departments, and I agree with that concept.

ADM. INGLIS: This does require departmental representation.

DIRECTOR: That is the view I would take on it. It says very flatly in NSC 50 that ICAPS should be the Staff of the DCI. And if they make up this report you are getting a one-sided report and it would be better to have the Standing Committee on it that do represent the Departments.

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MR. ARMSTRONG: Our view was that the NSC 50 tended, without specifically saying so, that ICAPS should be a joint staff in the same sense the NSC has a joint staff, responsible only to the DCI and made up of contributed personnel, but joint. And in that regard, in that case, I would consider qualified to even do these papers.

DIRECTOR: Any other comments on that? I very definitely hate to take a position, but I would like to get a vote. We are an interested party in it and it seems that our people could justly be accused of being unilateral.

MR. ARMSTRONG: I would prefer ICAPS, but don't feel strongly enough about it to make an issue of it.

ADM. INGLIS: I vote with the majority, provided ONI has an opportunity to comment on what comes out.

COL. DEVINE: Yes.

GEN. TODD: No.

GEN. CABELL: I am disqualified if it goes to ICAPS. Without compromising the principle, I think it belongs in ICAPS, but I raise my hand for the Standing Committee.

DR. COLBY: ICAPS.

DIRECTOR: Unanimous for the Standing Committee. The next thing that is on the agenda is this Watch Committee that was suggested by Mr. Armstrong, concerning Soviet intentions. I think, to a great extent that has already been met by this Check-off List that has been put in use in all the Departments which checks the special intelligence and regular intelligence on the thing. I think, I may be wrong, I am not too certain about the organization, but that State is the only place where there is a split in the organization that handles special intelligence. It doesn't hook up with the other. I think we have a Watch Committee on this and with G-2 and to a great extent Navy on the thing. Would you like to comment on it?

MR. ARMSTRONG: I don't understand the Check-off List.

DIRECTOR: Your SPS boys have it made up jointly by the ad hoc committee on what to look for on Russian movements and those particular things that might point to Russian intentions and I know SPS in State

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has had this and it is being used now by Air and by Army and by Navy on the thing and I am quite sure SPS uses it. There might be a difference in your own internal organization which does the same as any watch committee, It is even better than the watch committee because they are watching it all the time.

MR. ARMSTRONG: On a fused basis between regular intelligence and special intelligence in the other agencies?

DIRECTOR: Yes.

MR. ARMSTRONG: When we come to review the ORE Estimates, as the IAC has done twice, do all the agencies bring both elements into that group?

DIRECTOR: I am sure they would in that you are getting two different things there. When you come to the IAC Estimate on the thing, these are the people that are watching on the indications daily. The IAC Estimate would take the result of their work and bring it here and the Estimate would be made here by the IAC Members.

GEN. CABELL: This kind of appealed to me and I think the name also has an appeal. This check-off that you speak of is a very proper thing and a convenient tool for the watch committee to use, but you need the next step after that of the check-off. You need somebody to have the continuing responsibility for watching that check-off.

DIRECTOR: I think you have an extra step in there. I know your people like it because we get the highest praise from your people, but the Army and Navy are using it too and I don't think you need this watch committee because you have a watch committee on this check-off and if a red flag comes up it is immediately referred here. In my opinion you don't need an extra step before it comes here. I think if the alert goes up on this check-off it ought to come to the IAC because you are rapidly getting into a crisis situation and it should come here for an answer.

GEN. TODD: Under the present setup it is possible for CIA to know that other individual members were using this check-off, and when they get a red flag they know, but the others wouldn't know that and you

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DIRECTOR: You have the IAC make their anger^w on it here.

GEN. TODD: What I mean is it seems that on the present organization it might be possible for the interpretation of a particular bit of information to be left up to two parties, where if this committee were established the items of information would be interpreted by this entire group.

ADM. INGLIS: Every department gets all information.

DIRECTOR: It seems to me there is an extra step that is not needed. The thing is working now. If something comes up in the War Department and it hits our check-off list, certainly the procedure is that the Army or Air or Navy will call up their other boys and say "did you see this."

MR. ARMSTRONG: Is there a committee in existence now, which is a recognized check-off committee, with representation from the departments?

DIRECTOR: There are people that are working with this. Whenever any of these signs come up - troop movement activities, stocking of supplies, making fuel and ammunition dumps - which are made up jointly; that might be an indication. It is a very comprehensive thing.

GEN. CABELL: Does CIA have a similar check-off?

DIRECTOR: Yes.

GEN. CABELL: And an individual who checks that? Why don't we regularize the responsibility into several services to form a check-off committee under the chairmanship of the CIA member of that committee? It is just a device, as I see it, for giving this group the advantage of some joint action prior to the time these people are called to meet around the table.

MR. ARMSTRONG: That is what I had in mind.

DIRECTOR: I misunderstood you, I thought you were going to create another committee.

MR. ARMSTRONG: I didn't know there was a mechanism available like that. It still seems to me it is in pieces around the agency, not all together, and I thought it would be advantageous to the present members

or individuals who follow the check-off list, or whatever it is.

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DIRECTOR: We can put that in if that is agreeable; but we must try to avoid having an extra committee in here between these boys that are watching the fire alarm and ourselves.

GEN. CABELL: I say those are the logical ones to be the members of the committee.

DIRECTOR: And not have an extra committee because the responsibility for that fire alarm is there and when it bounces the boys will come here without going through another committee. That would be my idea on the thing. And, furthermore, I have a little hesitancy because of Mr. Johnson of calling it a committee. Maybe we could call it a consultants board or something like that. Is that agreeable?

ADM. INGLIS: I am satisfied with the present scheme as you outline it, providing we have a periodic review. I don't think there is going to be more than one red flag at a time because there are more than fifty, and maybe a hundred, items on this check-off and no one of these items is going to be conclusive. It would be the combination of a number of them and it isn't going to come like that (snap of the finger). I would be satisfied with the present system as long as we have an understanding that we will have a periodic review about once a month, or three months, or possibly every six months. Get ORE to bring the Estimate up-to-date even if it is a repetition. That is better than setting up another committee. That would be an extravagant use of man hours. If you want to have this other scheme, you can designate certain individuals who can communicate with each other whenever they see this or that.

DIRECTOR: I am willing to have a periodic review.

ADM. INGLIS: I agree with you on the responsibility and the charter. I wouldn't want to use the word "permanent" because I haven't the bodies for a full-time committee.

DIRECTOR: It has been some time since we have had a review. We can make a review now and then we can say we will have a periodic review every six months unless conditions change, or any member of the IAC can call a meeting any time.

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GEN. CABELL: I think it calls for an intermediate step between the necessity of having that check-off list and the periodic reviews. There should be frequent reviews by them of the several flags, whether they be at half-mast or full, because an individual may not be capable of raising a flag unless he sees someone else around the table with a flag at half-mast. I would suggest that this committee, or subcommittee, be formalized to meet not less than once a month to review its own check-off list and then the next step would be the periodic, roughly, every three or six months. I would suggest six months.

ADM. INGLIS: And a shorter period if any change came up.

DIRECTOR: Any change or at the call of an IAC Member, or if even one person thinks there is a change.

COL. DEVINE: The Director was very favorable toward the watch committee. He thought the matter wasn't being handled quite as well as it could be. However, he wanted certain changes in the watch committee and there are certain additions and deletions he would like to make. But in general he was favorable toward it.

DIRECTOR: The people doing it now meet periodically once a month or so and then reviews can be made every six months or so on demand. Is that satisfactory?

MR. ARMSTRONG: Yes, I would like to add one further thought that during the period on which they meet that in the interval they do exchange information.

ADM. INGLIS: Once a month.

GEN. CABELL: Once a month.

DIRECTOR: These people on the check list are supposed to meet once a day. Does anyone have anything else to bring up? If there is nothing else, that is all.

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